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This essay argues that Augustine structures his famous analysis, in Confessions 2, of his theft 
of pears by his understanding of the mode of insight rather than by his understanding of the mode 
of discovery. Therefore, while Augustine’s study explicitly includes what he thinks are the stages by 
which his audience can discover his principal insight that human nature is imago Dei, i.e. spiritually 
united with a Self-Sufficient and Creator God for the sake of attaining perfect union with Him, it is 
entirely from this imago Dei perspective that Augustine presents his account of the pear theft. 
Recognizing the center of Augustine’s approach, moreover, offers his reader two closely related 
benefits. These are opportunities, first, to overcome various limited criticisms and interpretations of 
Augustine’s analysis of the pear theft and, second, to see how Augustine’s rhetorical manner of 
confessio represents his perspective of insight. 
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(i) Introduction 
In a famous passage in book 2 of his Confessions (conf.), Augustine of Hippo (354 - 431 A.D.) 
recounts how at the age of sixteen he and his companions stole pears from a neighbor’s vineyard and, 
while delighting in their actions, simply threw away the pears to pigs.1 Augustine describes the event 
like this: 
There was a pear tree near our vineyard laden with fruit, though attractive neither in color nor taste. 
To shake the fruit off the tree and carry off the pears, I and a gang of naughty adolescents (nequissimi 
adolescentuli) set off late at night after (in our usual pestilential way) we had continued our game in 
the streets. We carried off a huge load of pears … merely to throw to the pigs. Even if we ate a few, 
nevertheless our pleasure lay in doing what was not allowed. … I had no motive for my wickedness 
except wickedness itself (et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi militia). It was foul (foeda erat) and 
I loved it (et amavi eam). I loved the self-destruction (amavi perire), I loved my fall (amavi defectum 
meum), not the object for which I had fallen (non illud ad quod deficiebam) but my fall itself (sed 
defectum meum ipsum amavi). My depraved soul leaped … to ruin. I was seeking not to gain anything 
by shameful means (non dedecore aliquid), but shame for its own sake (sed dedecus appetens).2  
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Many commentators maintain that Augustine is being scrupulous. While some imply that 
his theft of pears is no more than the typical action of a rebellious teenager3, each holds that his 
thievery is not the epitome of wickedness.4 The sense of the criticism is this: ‘Yes, he stole some pears
– but this pales beside the murderous actions of a Hitler. How, then, can a theft of pears represent
the depths of depravity?’ Along the same lines, some recent ethicists would criticize Augustine for 
measuring evil too much by motivation – i.e. by the psychological state of the evildoer5 – rather than 
by the effects of the evildoer’s actions upon others.6 Despite their differences, these commentators 
agree that Augustine’s analysis is overdone, the product of a tortured soul, and therefore largely 
irrelevant to contemporary human self-understanding.  
It is evident, however, that Augustine sees the matter somewhat differently. To start with, 
he does not think that his theft of pears typifies early adolescence.7 He certainly holds that each 
person is especially tempted to sin at that juncture in life. But he also understands that adolescents 
do not have to succumb to temptation8 since means are available enabling them (and anyone else) to 
embrace authentic law and authority.9 Second, Augustine nowhere claims in conf. 2 that stealing 
pears (for the sake of enjoying pears) is a terrible sin. In fact, his analysis of sin in 2.5.11 shows 
fundamental agreement with those who rate murder as a star instance of moral evil.10 Moreover, 
what Augustine means by ‘wickedness’ is less the theft of pears than his attempted larceny of some 
aspect of the divine nature. In other words, his stealing of pears with his companions was an 
instrument of and signifies the much greater sin of pride (superbia).11 As Augustine sees it, every sin 
(in terms of its metaphysical or objective dimensions12) represents a futile attempt to reject divine 
law and establish as law one’s own judgments and preferences, i.e. to arrogate divine status.13 
Whether recognized or not, each sinner intends to ‘play’ God. While sinning does this implicitly, the 
sixteen-year-old Augustine acted explicitly – which is much worse. Indeed, what he recounts by 
speaking of the theft of pears is that he knew and loved the self-destructive character of his claim to 
divinity. Hence, Augustine condemns as wickedness his self-conscious rejection of both God and his own 
personal integrity for the sake of basking in human glory. 
Most important, while a good number of recent commentators (e.g. MacDonald, Starnes, 
Cavadini, Vaught, and Crosby) share Augustine’s view in the matter, their analysis is incomplete 
since it underestimates, in some way, Augustine’s profound metaphysical doctrine ordering every 
sentence and paragraph in his entire Confessions, viz. that the human being (as imago Dei) is 
established together (i.e. in spiritual unity) with God for the sake of right union with Him. This 
outlook obviously informs Augustine’s confessional mode of discourse throughout conf.; he speaks 
at once to God, neighbor, and himself; and it is explicitly asserted in conf. (e.g. in 10.26-37-27.3814 & 
13.11.12) and employed throughout book two. In the latter regard, Augustine shows that the 
essence of sin cannot be the claim to divinity (2.6.13-14) unless man is already (at least to some 
degree) aware of, united with, and ordered to God. According to Augustine, this reality is known 
intuitively by the mind (e.g. the thief’s awareness that theft is morally wrong [2.4.9]) and is arrived 
at philosophically by a rigorous application of the doctrine of participation15 according to which 
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lower order realities (e.g. substances, core attributes of all substances [e.g. beauty], and cognitive acts) 
are understood to participate in some supreme, uncreated personal being known by, and therefore 
spiritually united with, the human mind. Man, in other words, is essentially theological. 
Although I will elaborate on this matter in my conclusion, Augustine’s moral theory or 
psychology entails that: (i) man (who exists by participation in God) has always some relationship 
with and is ordering divine goods (viz. God’s law and truth) and created goods (which exist by 
participation in God); (ii) man should order created goods to divine goods; (iii) sin consists in 
ordering divine goods to created goods; and (iv) while lesser sins are committed for the sake of 
enjoying wrongly some created good, the greatest sins are committed to embrace wrongly some 
divine good. In other words, while lesser sins go against God indirectly the greatest sins go against 
Him directly. Hence, Augustine maintains in conf. 2 that what he did as a teenager, viz. stealing pears 
for the goal of claiming divine status, is far worse than stealing pears for the sake of food or revenge 
upon one’s neighbor. While each sin contradicts personal integrity, the former contradicts personal 
integrity absolutely since, generically speaking, it is the paradigmatic sin in which every sin 
participates. For our purpose, this brings two crucial implications. First, Augustine’s claim that his 
theft of pears signifies his attempt to arrogate God’s power as the source and goal of the moral law is 
grounded in the metaphysical principle that man is established in relationship and for the sake of 
right union with God. And second, a comprehensive account of Augustine’s analysis of his grievous 
sin depends on understanding the aforementioned principle. 
With this in mind, we can infer that the commentators on Augustine’s theft of pears fall into 
three groups. Some accuse him of scrupulosity; others argue that he fails to explain adequately the 
problems of sin he considers (e.g. Mann [1979]); and a third group maintains that he sets out a cogent 
overall analysis both of his sin and of the structure of human sin generally (e.g. Starnes, MacDonald, 
Wills, Cavadini, Vaught, and Crosby). While those holding that Augustine is scrupulous do not 
distinguish (i) the sin of theft from the sin of pride and (ii) its philosophical ground, those 
maintaining that Augustine does not ultimately provide an intelligible account of wrong-doing 
(Mann [1979]) distinguish his sin of pride but fail to recognize its philosophical ground. And finally, 
those asserting that Augustine provides a cogent account of wrong-doing (Starnes, Wills, 
MacDonald, Cavadini, Vaught and Crosby)16 distinguish the sin of pride but neglect to elucidate 
crucial aspects of both that sin (pertaining to Augustine’s motivations and pleasure in his act) and 
Augustine’s doctrine of wrong-doing because they underestimate, in diverse ways, Augustine’s 
profound philosophical ground.  
This essay will argue, therefore, that each party falls short of explicating some crucial aspect 
of Augustine’s teaching for two closely related reasons pertaining, on the one hand, to content and, 
on the other, to method. Concerning content, each party neglects – albeit in varying manners – to 
recognize Augustine’s fundamental framework of analysis that man participates in God by the mode 
of spiritual relationship. This common oversight, however, can be traced to a shared deficiency in 
their method. On this score, each party focuses too much on Augustine’s account of the order of 
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discovery and too little, therefore, on his teaching concerning the order of being. Augustine’s analysis 
includes both approaches but his confessio mode of exposition emphasizes the order of being since 
that is, he thinks, what the order of discovery ultimately teaches. In this respect, Augustine’s medium 
represents his message.  
(ii) Conf. 2.4-10: Augustine considers his theft of pears 
Augustine introduces consideration of his theft of pears by proclaiming that stealing is 
contrary to the moral law that is (i) promulgated by God and (ii) writ on the heart of every person.17 
He writes:  
Theft (Furtum) receives certain punishment by your law (Exod. 20: 15) Lord, and by the law written 
in the hearts of men (Rom. 2:14) which not even iniquity itself destroys (quam ne ipsa quidem delet 
iniquitas). For what thief can with equanimity endure being robbed by another thief (quis enim fur 
aequo animo furem patitur)? He cannot tolerate it even if he is rich and the other is destitute.18
Augustine begins with this example because he thinks it shows that every thief (including 
the sixteen-year-old Augustine) has some notion/awareness of divine law. According to Augustine, 
each human being is subject to an objective moral standard (i) deriving from God, (ii) structuring 
his relationship with God and neighbor, and (iii) implying that he is made for the sake of right union 
with God and neighbor. Hence, Augustine claims that it is by adhering to such law that we fashion 
right order in the way we procure the goods, for which we have natural inclinations, like food, 
shelter, clothing, friendship, and knowledge.19  
As Augustine sees it, the contradiction of the thief who refuses to suffer theft is this: on the 
one hand, he appropriates what he knows belongs to another; on the other hand, he refuses to allow 
others to appropriate what he knows belongs to him. The thief both asserts and denies the same law 
in one and the same respect – and this is only possible because he recognizes (i) an objective law 
against theft and (ii) it is in his power to obey or disobey the law. So, as the thief is ordered through 
law to God, and consequently to human flourishing, it follows that when he breaks the law he 
contradicts and diminishes himself.20 
As we remember, Augustine claims that he stole the pears because he wanted to do evil for 
its own sake – thus far defined as the intention to break the moral law precisely because of what it is 
(et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi militia).21 To show the gravity of his sin, Augustine spends 
the remainder of book 2 analyzing philosophically the theft of pears. This is accomplished by 
bringing before his reader an analysis of sin – in terms of its objects, motives, and metaphysical 
dimensions. Augustine begins by asserting that sin does not consist in enjoying the temporal goods 
that attract us. On the contrary, these goods, whether physical or social, attract us insofar as they 
fulfill our innate inclinations to good, especially to beauty, and are rightly enjoyed if properly 
ordered by the soul. Augustine writes:  
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There is beauty (species est pulchris) in lovely physical objects, as in gold and silver and all other such 
things. When the body touches such things, much significance attaches to the rapport of the object 
with the touch. Each of the other senses has its own appropriate mode of response to physical things. 
Temporal honor and the power of giving orders and of being in command have their own kind of 
dignity. … The life which we live in this world has its attractiveness because of a certain measure in 
its beauty and its harmony with all these inferior objects that are beautiful. Human friendship is also 
a nest of love and gentleness because of the unity it brings about between many souls.22  
According to Augustine, then, sin is disorder; it occurs when the soul23 subordinates its 
proper object, the highest and supreme (because non-participated or uncreated) Good, viz. God, to 
lower goods, i.e. to goods that are such by participation in God.24 As the soul is a participated good 
made (i) in relationship with God and (ii) to achieve happiness or fulfillment by embracing Him 
above all created goods and therefore by ordering to God (as He sees fit) its pursuit and enjoyment 
of created goods, sin happens when the soul wants to enjoy a created good in such a manner that 
(objectively speaking) it attempts to elevate that good’s intrinsic value while reducing the intrinsic 
value of God. Augustine writes:  
Yet sin is committed (peccatum admittitur) for the sake of all these things and others of this kind 
when, in consequence of an immoderate urge towards those things which are at the bottom end of 
the scale of good, we abandon the higher and supreme goods (meliora et summa deseruntur), that is 
you, Lord God, and your truth and your law (tu, domine deus noster, et veritas tua, et lex tua). These 
inferior goods have their delights, but not comparable to my God who has made them all (qui fecit 
omnia). It is in him that the just person takes delight (in ipso delectatur iustus); he is the joy of those 
who are true of heart (ipse est deliciae rectorum corde) (Ps. 63:11).25  
To support his definition of sin, Augustine cites as evidence our common analysis of crimes. 
We maintain that there is a motive behind every crime and usually identify it with the desire to enjoy 
an inferior/participated good like property of some kind, sexual relations, money, or human 
justice.26 Within this framework of analysis, Augustine searches for his motive in the theft of pears: 
“Wretch that I was, what did I love in you (Quid … in te amavi), my act of theft (furtum meum), 
that crime which I did at night in the sixteenth year of my life?”27 He wonders if his theft was 
precipitated by an undue desire for the participated good that is the pears. He discloses, however, 
that he stole neither to enjoy the pears’ appearance or taste nor, for that matter, to satisfy a hunger 
for food. It had nothing to do with the beauty or utility of the pears; rather, his motive was directly 
related to the act of theft. In his case, the stolen object could just as well have been a car, computer, 
or towels from a hotel. Augustine writes: 
The fruit which we stole was beautiful but was not that which my miserable soul coveted. I had a 
quantity of better pears. But those I picked solely with the motive of stealing. I threw away what I 
had picked. My feasting was only on the wickedness which I took pleasure in enjoying (epulatus inde 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 2, 2018
13 
solam iniquitatem qua laetabar fruens). If any of those pears entered my mouth, my criminality was 
the piquant sauce (condimentum ibi facinus erat).28
What pleasure, then, was he trying to procure? In other words, what does it mean to ‘feast 
on wickedness’? Augustine begins to unravel this mystery by asking if his theft was carried out for 
the sake of some real or apparent participated good aside from the pears. Taking a panoramic view 
of participated goods, he compares his theft to (i) acts of virtue; (ii) qualities in the mind and body; 
(iii) the orderly movements of the stars and the cycle of death and birth which preserves living 
creatures; and (iv) specious vices (i.e. to some apparent good). He discovers, however, that his 
pleasure cannot be identified with any of the above. His action was not for the sake of (i) cultivating 
the virtue of justice; (ii) developing his intelligence or muscles; (iii) benefiting the pigs (e.g. to satisfy 
their appetite for food) or the vineyards (e.g. planting more trees or fertilizing the ground); or (iv) 
robbing the rich to feed the poor.29  
The primary object of Augustine’s theft, then, was neither the pears nor some other 
participated good that employs the theft of pears as its means. Rather, he acted for the sake of what 
is worse than a specious vice, viz. vice itself. Where, then, is his pleasure found? Based on his analysis 
thus far, we can only surmise that Augustine’s satisfaction consists in using the lower goods for the 
express purpose of subordinating the highest good. This is because to steal for its own sake means 
that one’s pleasure is found in breaking the law and defying the One who makes and enforces it. If 
Augustine does not want to enjoy any real or apparent participated good, he must want to enjoy 
what belongs to the God who forbids theft. 
For this reason, Augustine now offers his second, more profound and decisive, account of sin 
that is centered on a study of pride (superbia). He identifies superbia as the essential motive behind 
every sin, and his principal teaching is that every sinner – whether the latter recognizes it or not – 
aims to appropriate what belongs to God. This is because if each good the sinner desires exists by 
participation in or is God, it follows that every sin represents the sinner’s desire to arrogate some 
aspect of the divine nature. In short, sin consists in setting oneself in the place of God.30 
Moreover, the sinner who arrogates what belongs to God (i.e. perversely imitates God) can 
take nothing from Him for He is Goodness. Rather he can only take something (viz. goodness) from 
himself, i.e. diminish his own capacity for right order. In reality, then, the sinner gets the opposite 
of what he wants; instead of procuring goodness he loses it. The ambitious person who wants the 
honor and glory due to others – and, above all else, to God – loses the honor and glory that is his 
due. The cruel leader, seeking only to be feared, loses the fear owed him as leader; and the curious 
person, striving to know what he doesn’t need to know, fails to gain the knowledge he ought to have. 
Likewise, the idle, by rejecting work, lose the rest that is their due (as the result of hard work); and 
the vengeful person who takes justice into his own hands loses the justice owed to him by others. On 
this basis, Augustine maintains that every sinner fornicates away from God: 
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So the soul fornicates (Ps. 72:27) when it is turned away from you (fornicator anima, cum avertitur 
abs te) and seeks outside you (et quaerit extra te) the pure and clear intentions which are not to be 
found except by returning to you (ea quae pura et liquida non invenit, nisi cum redit ad te). In their 
perverted way, all humanity imitates you. Yet they put themselves at a distance from you and exalt 
themselves against you. But even by thus imitating you they acknowledge that you are the creator of 
all nature and so concede that there is no place where one can entirely escape from you.31
According to Augustine, every sin is futile and self-contradictory because the sinner exists 
by participation in and, therefore, by ordination to God. There can be no rebellion – no attempt to 
set up a contrary order – unless there is an objective order to rebel against in the first place. How 
does the sinner imitate God? By trying to order, according to his standard, what is already and can 
only be ordered by God the Creator. The sinner, in other words, claims divine status as the ultimate 
source of being, value, and reward and punishment. Why does Augustine maintain that this hostile 
attitude towards God is nonetheless an acknowledgement of God? Because when the sinner denies 
God in one respect he necessarily embraces Him in another respect. As everything (including the 
sinner) exists by participation in God, and as the sinner is established (by God) in relationship with 
God for the sake of achieving right union with Him, his rejection of God means that he embraces as 
God some good that participates in God. At bottom, this is himself and/or some good that is God 
but is wanted apart from Him.  
Augustine advances here an important insight that is missed by those holding that he 
ultimately distinguishes no adequate motive (in the sense of ‘his pursuit of some [apparent] good’) 
in his theft of pears.32 Unlike Augustine, these thinkers focus their analysis on only one aspect of the 
subjective dimension of Augustine’s motivation. In particular, they neglect to consider sufficiently 
the adolescent Augustine’s simultaneous desire for divine omnipotence and human glory; in general, 
they fail to recognize Augustine’s primary teaching that as man is spiritually united with God each 
of his thoughts and actions have an accompanying theological aspect.  
Even if someone claims ‘to do evil for its own sake’ (including the person who wants to 
commit suicide and believes that death brings personal annihilation) the corresponding objective 
dimensions of his action would be essentially the same as the sixteen-year-old Augustine’s since the 
standard of analysis is no less than an objective (i.e. metaphysical) understanding of the human 
person in relationship with and fulfilled in God. In other words, that motivation means the agent 
wants to arrogate divine omnipotence – claiming that he/she, rather than God, creates human being 
and thereby determines right and wrong, and reward and punishment. As Augustine’s objective 
account of human personhood entails relationship with God, it follows that – whether the human 
agent is aware of it or not – his motives and actions have an inherent theological dimension. Again, 
if the suicide (i) no longer wants to be (period) or (ii) wants to be cast into hell by God (e.g. Ivan 
Karamazov in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov) then, all things considered, he really wants 
to be God. Put differently, the good he embraces as God is in one respect himself and in another 
respect God. This person knowingly wills what does not perfect him but his own existing as a 
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participated good in relationship with God means, objectively speaking, that his will for self-
destruction (insofar as it contravenes divine law) is also a will for some good either by participation 
in God or because it is God! At the same time, then, as the sinner rejects God in one respect he 
embraces Him in another respect. For this reason, Augustine calls someone with this mind-set ‘a 
runaway slave’.  
Therefore, since man is spiritually established with God he always embraces the non-
participated Good in some respect. If man is rightly ordered, he orders himself to God; if he is 
wrongly ordered, he orders God to himself (i.e. wants to be God). Hence, they are mistaken who 
maintain Augustine teaches that his theft of pears is not motivated by the pursuit of some 
(ontological) good. The young Augustine wants what is ontologically good – the problem is that he 
does not want this in a manner that is morally good. Consequently, they are also mistaken who hold 
that persons can act for no apparent good at all. Someone might say he is acting for no apparent good 
but in the ultimate scheme of things he is really making a claim to divinity, and he himself is the 
apparent good he is acting for. Those who ignore these distinctions analyze insufficiently 
Augustine’s reflections on his theft of pears, overlooking especially the profound dignity he ascribes 
to the human person. 
In any event, it is Augustine’s point that the sinner acknowledges God at the same time as he 
rejects Him. Therefore, since man is established in relationship and for the sake of right union with 
God, rebellion against the divine order is both (i) rebellion against personal integrity and (ii) an 
implicit recognition of divine sovereignty. Even though sin is spiritual suicide, the sinner gives glory 
to God.  
Returning to Augustine’s analysis of his theft of pears, he asks: what does it really mean to 
steal for the sake of stealing? It signifies that the thief desires to usurp the role of divine lawgiver. The 
adolescent Augustine arrogates divine omnipotence; by breaking God’s law, he claims to be his own 
law – or, put differently, that he belongs to and is ordered to himself rather than to God. Like the 
biblical accounts of Satan and the first human couple in the Garden of Eden, the young Augustine 
wants to possess God’s power to determine and enforce the distinction between good and evil. 
However, as his integrity depends on obeying divine law, what he ‘gains’ by disobedience is 
powerlessness to do what he ought, viz. to obey God’s law. Since his desire to usurp the divine power 
depends, in the first place, on his participation in divine power – his very ability to act derives from 
God – Augustine’s sin causes him to diminish his own power. By embracing what is unreal, a 
shadow, he becomes, in that respect, unreal himself. Augustine writes:  
Therefore in that act of theft what was the object of my love (quid ergo in illo furto ego dilexi), and 
in what way did I viciously and perversely imitate my Lord (et in quo dominum meum vel vitiose 
atque perverse imitatus sum)? Was my pleasure to break your law, but by deceit, since I had not the 
power to do that by force? Was I acting like a prisoner with restricted liberty who does without 
punishment what is not permitted, thereby making an assertion of possessing a dim resemblance to 
omnipotence (tenebrosa omnipotentiae similitudine)? Here is a runaway slave fleeing his master and 
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pursuing a shadow (Job 7:2). What rottenness! What a monstrous life and an abyss of death! Was it 
possible to take pleasure in what was illicit for no reason other than that it was not allowed (potuitne 
libere quod non licebat, non ob aliud nisi quia non licebat)?33
Hence, what fruit (i.e. gain or pleasure) did the young Augustine procure from the sin? From 
the perspective of Confessor Augustine’s objective account of the human person’s relationship with 
God, the answer is nothing positive (nihil). On that basis, the ‘pleasure’ or ‘thrill’34 the young 
Augustine experiences is not a gain but a loss or negation. As a person (and therefore as ordered to 
perfect spiritual union with God), he is beset by deficiency, disorder, disintegration or privation; he 
is ‘less human’35 than before since his open hostility towards God means that he possesses a weaker 
disposition towards God.  
Augustine’s sin, therefore, is a nothing because it moves him away from his proper end of 
unity with God. In this sense too (i) the praise of the gang and (ii) Augustine’s pleasure in his actions 
are nothings for these draw him away from virtue, true friendship, and right pleasure.36 What 
Augustine and his gang identified as ‘gain’ is really a ‘loss’ of personal integrity. In his words:  
What fruit (fructum) had I’, wretched boy, in these things (Rom. 6.21) … above all in that theft in 
which I loved nothing but the theft itself? The theft itself was a nothing (nihil) and for that reason I 
was the more miserable. Yet had I been alone I would not have done it (et tamen solus id non fecissem) 
… alone I would not have done it. Therefore my love in that act was to be associated with the gang in
whose company I did it (ergo amavi ibi etiam consortium eorum cum quibus id feci). Does it follow 
that I loved something other than the theft? No nothing else (nihil aliud) in reality (quid est re vera) 
because association with the gang is also a nothing (quia et illud nihil est) … my pleasure was not in 
the pears (in illis pomis voluptas mihi non erat); it was in the crime itself (ea erat in ipso facinore), 
done in association with a sinful group (quam faciebat consortium simul peccantium).37
Moreover, Augustine understands that the pleasure taken in defying God (and therefore, 
objectively speaking, in harming himself) was inseparable from the pleasure gained from recognizing 
the gang’s approval of his actions.38 In other words, these two things together constituted his 
satisfaction in the theft. This is important for three reasons.  
In the first place, it confirms Augustine’s assertion that his motivation in the crime was not 
simply for the lower goods of human friendship and glory but these were sought in conjunction 
with his primary interest to defy God. That ‘he would not have done it if he had been alone’ doesn’t 
mean he acted simply for the sake of friendship and glory but that the type of friendship and glory 
he sought by his act of defiance would not have been available if he had acted alone. Augustine did 
not have two distinct motives but his primary motive had two intimately related components – in 
this instance, to openly defy God is at the same time to seek glory from depraved men.  
MacDonald, therefore, is right that Augustine uses his doctrine of pride “to unlock a 
resolution to the central puzzle of the theft of pears.”39 In the long run, however, MacDonald40 does 
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not adequately integrate the motivation of pride with the motivation for friendship because he 
neglects to acknowledge the metaphysical principle upon which Augustine’s entire analysis rests, viz. 
that man is established in relationship and for the sake of right union with God and, therefore, with 
neighbor. What I mean is this. MacDonald’s interpretation surpasses Wills’ interpretation because 
while the latter ultimately identifies Augustine’s principal motive as the pursuit of “a false ideal of 
companionship”41 MacDonald holds that Augustine’s “motivational state” is a “composite” of (i) 
the desire to claim for himself divine status, i.e. “a kind of limitless freedom and power,” and (ii) the 
desire “to be included in the fellowship of rogues.”42 Unlike Wills, therefore, MacDonald identifies 
as Augustine’s motivation both the explicit urge for divinity and the urge for false friendship. 
MacDonald, however, fails to relate together these two components of Augustine’s motivation in 
anything more than an accidental manner. Although he acknowledges that these motives “work 
crucially together” in Augustine’s analysis43, his subsequent comments suggest the opinion that each 
of the aforementioned motives is sufficient unto itself and happen to converge in Augustine’s mind 
in his theft of pears.44 All things considered, this leaves MacDonald with the odd claim that 
Augustine both has and has not one motivation in his theft of pears.  
These difficulties are cleared up, however, if we recognize and apply Augustine’s organizing 
principle. For if man is established in relationship and for the sake of right union (or friendship) with 
God and neighbor, then the desire to arrogate the divine omnipotence necessarily entails that the 
neighbor (viz. Augustine and his gang) is elevated to the status of God and God is relegated to the 
status of creature. Or, put differently, the decision to embrace the gang’s commands as absolute and 
binding necessarily requires allocating divine omnipotence to the gang. Most important, this insight 
allows us to see (i) that Augustine has essentially one motive with (as MacDonald rightly asserts) two 
inseparable components, and (ii) why these components “in his analysis, work crucially together.”45 
Starnes provides a more complete solution to the matter than MacDonald46 but he seems to 
link together Augustine’s twin motivations from the perspective of psychology rather than from the 
perspective of metaphysics. It is one thing to maintain that Augustine’s desire for omnipotence 
depends on “some objective recognition that this was the case” and “in order to be established 
objectively it must in some way be recognized by someone other than Augustine.”47 But it is quite 
another to show the essential cause in which the aforementioned distinction participates. It is true 
that (i) (pace MacDonald) in Augustine’s circumstances these motives were inseparable and (ii) (pace 
Starnes) these motives are inseparable psychologically. However, it is more precise to say that these 
motives are united since, based on Augustine’s account of the order of reality, the divine and the 
human are spiritually united. In other words, Augustine’s philosophical psychology unites the 
aforementioned motives for divinity and for friendship because his psychology is grounded in the 
metaphysical claim that man is spiritually established with and ordained for perfect spiritual union 
with God. If man is essentially theological, his thoughts and actions have theological meaning. 
On this basis, the limitation of Starnes’ psychological analysis is visible in two other areas. 
First, he thinks that Augustine could only have acted alone if he was insane (i.e. “to retreat into 
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idiocy”) for in this instance there would have been no object to confer on him the ‘divinity’ he 
sought.48 Starnes is certainly right that Augustine’s particular sin requires the gang’s presence since 
Augustine intends to gain glory from his like-minded companions through sharing with them the 
common medium of arrogating divine omnipotence. However, Augustine doesn’t need the gang to 
commit the sin of pride and pat himself on the back for doing it. This is because if each individual is 
spiritually established with God then there is a way wherein every act of pride is carried out apart 
from human community. Starnes’ analysis of Augustine’s particular sin of pride is generally accurate 
but Augustine’s sin is a species rather than the essence of pride. Starnes justifiably asserts that God 
will not bestow glory on the prideful (if that is what they seek) and that such glory can therefore only 
be received from like-minded others. Nevertheless, as Augustine claims elsewhere49, the sin of pride 
is carried out ‘before’ God in advance of being manifested to men. Since pride occurs in the recesses 
of the human heart it is intrinsically social in one way, i.e. in terms of the sinner’s relationship with 
God, before it is social in another, i.e. concerning the sinner’s relationship with other men. In this 
respect, the proud person acts, i.e. exalts himself, before God in advance of acting before men and, 
to the extent that he sees the probability of attaining what he wants, he likely congratulates himself 
both before and after he receives glory from like-minded others. Hence, Augustine acted ‘alone’ in 
order to act before men because he glorifies himself, in the first place, to spurn God and, in the 
second place, to seek glory for spurning God from like-minded men.  
Second, while Starnes identifies the fruit of Augustine’s sin as “the love of those with whom 
he stole”50 he neglects (perhaps because of his psychological perspective) to consider sufficiently why 
Augustine says that his fruit, i.e. his satisfaction and his gang, were essentially ‘nothings’. Starnes 
justifiably identifies these as depraved realities51 but, unrecognized by him, this distinction is 
ultimately made on the basis of the metaphysical principle that man is established in relationship and 
for the sake of right union with God. For according to the strictest application of this principle what 
moves the sinner away from God brings negation (disintegration) and what brings the sinner 
towards God brings something positive (integration). On this basis, we can see that Augustine’s 
affirmation by his friends is a ‘nothing’ because the pleasure he takes in this is a false pleasure having 
the effect of diminishing his integrity. The point is not that nothing occurred –Augustine was 
congratulated by his friends and gratified by this; however, in terms of the telos of his personhood, 
what happened was a negative reality. Likewise, the gang Augustine loved is a ‘nothing’ for the same 
reasons as above. His companions are real persons joined together for a common goal but their 
orientation is for falsity and sin rather than for divine truth and law. As such, Augustine’s love for 
the gang is a negative reality since it diminishes his integrity.  
Therefore what one perspective classifies as ‘deficient realities’ the other perspective classifies 
as ‘nothings’. These insights are obviously compatible but, from an ontological perspective, the 
former participates in the latter since to classify the aforementioned realities as ‘deficient’ depends 
on viewing them in light of the principle that man is established in relationship for the sake of right 
union with God. In other words, Augustine’s pleasure and his gang are ‘deficient’ realities because, 
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viewed in light of an objective understanding of the nature and destiny of the human person, they 
are essentially ‘nothings’. What Starnes says about these realities is illuminating and essentially 
correct on its own level but in this instance (as before) his analysis presupposes Augustine’s first 
principle without making clear everything it implies. 
That said, the second reason why Augustine emphasizes that his pleasure was composed of 
defying God together with gaining the gang’s approval is because it shows plainly that he could not 
take from God the good he wants. In reality, Augustine cannot possess divine omnipotence52; he 
only has the appearance of omnipotence (in truth, the reality of impotence) because like-minded 
persons share with him the same goal – and therefore illusion. Since Augustine cannot possess the 
higher good he seeks, he procures some semblance of that good under the condition that others share 
with him the same vice. ‘Alone he could not have done it’ because, under such circumstances, the 
‘pleasure’ Augustine sought after could not have been gained.53 
And thirdly, the composite nature of Augustine’s pleasure discloses that the gang has 
become his ‘God.’ This is because it has tried to usurp the divine prerogative to (i) determine the 
distinction between good and evil, and (ii) confer honor and glory upon those it deems deserving. 
The gang establishes itself as God so that its members can have the appearance of getting what they 
want.  
As a result, Augustine and his companions have diminished their power to obey God. By 
trying to take from God–nay more, by claiming that they own themselves (i.e. are non-participated 
goods) and are therefore the ultimate goal of their actions – they end up taking from themselves. 
Hence, Augustine remarks that nothing can be more demeaning and unstable than subjecting 
oneself to the whims of a wicked gang according to which “As soon as the words are spoken ‘Let us 
go and do it’, one is ashamed not to be shameless?”54 
Finally, these considerations allow us to weigh Crosby’s provocative claim that Augustine’s 
analysis of human willing contradicts the perennial doctrine that “the will has for its object the good 
so that it desires whatever it desires under the aspect of good and cannot desire anything under the 
aspect of bad.”55 In short, Crosby wonders: how can it be asserted that man is (i) ordered to God as 
his ultimate end and (ii) capable of rejecting Him? If we hold that ‘to be ordered’ is ‘to be determined’ 
(in the sense of what excludes choice of will) these claims appear contradictory.56 Augustine’s study 
of his theft of pears, however, asserts otherwise. To show this requires making three cardinal 
distinctions. In the first place, we consider various meanings of the term ‘ordered’ – as (i) determined 
or fixed, (ii) oriented towards (i.e. willingly ordered), and (iii) subject to (i.e. unwillingly ordered). 
Second, we distinguish ontological goodness from moral goodness. And third, we demarcate the 
character of will when it is joined with divine aid from when it is not therewith united.  
To begin with, Augustine maintains that will (i.e. mind’s power by which it seeks out and 
joins itself to goods for the sake of what pleases it) is ordered to good. Insofar as every good either is 
or participates in God (2.5.10) and to be human is to be established in relationship with created and 
uncreated goods for the sake of right union with God (2.6.13-14), it follows that will always tends 
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towards ontological goods. However, as considered immediately below, Augustine also understands 
that will does not always, i.e. in terms of its existential character, tend towards its proper good of 
morality. In other words, will always pursues good but it does not always pursue God, the Supreme 
Good, since it does not always want to enjoy participated goods in the right way, i.e. as ordered to 
God. The adolescent Augustine, for example, steals the pears because he wants the goods of divine 
power, human friendship and glory. The problem, however, is that he wants to possess them in the 
wrong way. As a result, he loses integrity. Therefore, insofar as Augustine holds that will always tends 
towards ontological good and every such good either is or participates in God it follows, in this 
respect, that will is ordered, in the sense of being determined, towards good but it is only implicitly 
determined towards the Supreme Good, God Himself. 
Augustine asserts, therefore, that will is subject to the moral law (i.e. to moral 
goodness/God/relating properly to ontological goods) but does not always embrace – i.e. is not 
determined to – this law. Why is that? In one way will is structured, qua created, in relationship with 
God to explicitly love Him but, according to the nature of love, this requires will to explicitly 
subordinate itself to and co-operate with God. In another way, will can be weighed down by Original 
and personal sin since these can exacerbate a will’s delight in ontological goods over moral goods. On 
this basis, will’s negative inheritance and past actions can ‘add’ to it certain accidental or non-
essential characteristics (including bad habits) that motivate it to behave contrary to its objective, i.e. 
divinely created, ordination. Will as such, then, is determined to choose (i) between ontological 
goods and (ii) between moral good and evil but, other things being equal, it is not determined to 
choose this over that ontological good, virtue instead of vice or God over man. Any of these would 
negate will’s nature to co-operate freely with God.  
Insofar as will, therefore, is subject to divine law and the latter either is or participates in God, 
it follows that will is ‘ordered to’ God in the sense of ‘being subject to’ and fulfilled in Him. Since (i) 
will is determined to ontological goods and to choice making and subject to moral goods, and (ii) all 
goods either participate in or are God, it follows that will is ordered to God as its end – not as 
determined to Him but as oriented towards and/or subject to Him. While will embracing divine aid 
(e.g. the repentant Augustine who writes conf. 2) is both subject to and oriented towards moral 
goodness, will rejecting divine aid (e.g. the Augustine who commits the theft of pears) is only subject 
to moral goodness. In both instances, will is ordered to God; in neither instance is it determined to 
Him. Only in the first case, however, is will willingly ordered (i.e. willingly oriented) to God. Hence, 
Confessor Augustine freely acknowledges his dependence on God so that his potentiality for perfect 
relationship with Him can be actualized.  
Three clarifications are in order here. First, a more direct route establishing will’s ordination 
to God is found by applying to it Augustine’s doctrine of participation. Since everything exists in 
likeness to God in terms of its existence, mode of existence, and development towards its end, it follows, 
on Augustine’s terms, that will is ordered to God as its end. To hold otherwise means that will is 
non-existent and therefore uncreated. However, since will can rebel against its end and requires right 
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development to be explicitly united with God, it is also apparent that will exists in a state of 
incompleteness (i.e. it is in a state of potency towards its proper end) that is exaggerated by its 
privative state since, as Augustine’s theft of pears shows, will can have non-essential dispositions 
contrary to its proper end that are rooted in negative inherited and/or personal experience. Thus, 
the young Augustine’s will has a limited orientation towards God. 
Second, Crosby’s nuanced analysis of Augustine’s theft of pears causes him to claim that 
Augustine upholds two principles of which, in reality, he only upholds one. While Augustine agrees 
that will always retains some “connection with bonum…”57, he denies that will “is not by its very 
nature tethered to the good….”58 As we have seen, Augustine maintains that will is a good that always 
pursues what is ontologically good. But he would concur with Crosby’s second assertion if the latter 
means that will is not determined ‘to God’. On this score, however, Augustine would distinguish his 
will’s divinely created nature, and consequently its objective orientation, from the essentially 
external or adventitious dispositions that his will’s dependence on fallen Adam (which weakens will’s 
objective character) and his own personal experience have added to (or subtracted from) itself and 
helped to motivate the young Augustine to contradict his will’s objective orientation. So, by 
recounting how he rejected The Supreme Good in favor of created goods, Augustine claims that will 
is ‘tethered to the good’ apart from being tethered to the Supreme Good. As he argues in conf. 8, 
Augustine understands that the latter phenomenon requires the aid of divine grace.  
What, then, causes Crosby to misinterpret Augustine? This is likely for three related reasons. 
First, Crosby does not distinguish between what is ontologically good and what is morally good – in 
the former respect, will always engages what is good; in the latter respect, will engages the moral law 
but can receive or reject it on account of its capacity to pursue the good(s) it judges to satisfy. Second, 
Crosby neglects to adequately consider the distinction between will’s character qua created (which 
means it can fail) and will’s character qua affected by past human choice-making (which can incline 
it towards failure). While Augustine holds that bad choices can dull or vitiate will’s objective 
orientation towards the Supreme Good, Crosby’s implied view of will’s “very nature” suggests that 
will’s previous choices, i.e. what originates from Adam and from the will’s personal activity, are also 
divinely created. Third, and most important, Crosby does not uphold Augustine’s primary 
metaphysical doctrine that man is a participated good who always engages created and uncreated 
goods. Put differently, Crosby neglects to consider both ‘will’ (and more generally ‘man’) and bonum 
within the relationship centered metaphysical framework of participation that Augustine employs.  
On this score, Augustine’s relationship principle is a key to answering Crosby’s claim since 
it can account for the apparently contradictory phenomenon that ‘will is tethered to good but not 
to the Supreme Good.’ How so? While in the abstract God’s Love necessarily exceeds human love 
and it is therefore highly probable that, in the long run, man will become ‘tethered’ to the Supreme 
Good by the mode of his special relationship with God, the relationship principle entails, on the 
divine side, that God can share His Love with man in a developmental or incremental manner and, 
on the human side, that man can, therefore, respond to/love God in a developmental/incremental 
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manner. This cannot entail that man should ever reject God or that he can ultimately reject Him. 
Nor can it be the case that God positively wants human will to reject Him since that would make 
Him the cause of moral evil. But it is certainly admissible to hold that God can permit will to reject 
Him (for a period of time) for the sake of some good – so that will, for example, comes to understand 
that it is love and He is Love, and to love Him as such. Therefore, depending on the circumstances, 
God might share His Love, in one way, wherein It is less powerful than human love (whereby It can 
be rejected by man for a duration) and, in another way, that It can be more powerful than human 
love (so that, as Augustine’s notion of heaven would entail, It cannot be rejected because It is loved 
by man in and through Its Love). What human love is, then, is in one way constant, viz. the capacity 
to love. However, its existential character depends on the degree to which the aforesaid capacity is 
actualized and, therefore, on the nature of love’s concrete relationship with God’s Love. So, yes, 
human love/will is tethered, in a manner, to the Supreme Good, but this is by the mode of 
relationship. Most important, if love and Love, man and God, are relational, it can be explained why 
man, in one phase of will’s relationship with God (i.e. the phase to which Augustine’s theft of pears 
belongs), is determined to good apart from being determined to the Supreme Good.    
Therefore, like those commentators holding that Augustine (i) is scrupulous and/or (ii) fails 
to provide compelling analysis for his theft of pears and/or (iii) offers a compelling explanation in 
terms of identifying two motivations, Crosby misinterprets key aspects of Augustine’s teaching on 
the theft of pears because he underestimates Augustine’s profound doctrine on the dignity of the 
human person. 
Finally, our now developed analysis of Augustine’s account of man’s relationship-centered 
ordination to God renders more intelligible than before conf. 2.8.16’s assertion that each of the 
adolescent Augustine’s (i) attempted theft of divinity, and (ii) the pleasure he attained through the 
praise and friendship of the gang, were ‘nothings’ (i.e. nihils). For insofar as Augustine pursues 
ontological goods and experiences ‘pleasure’ in his actions ‘nothing’ (nihil) cannot mean ‘non-
good/non-being’ absolutely speaking (as if to say that he neither pursued nor enjoyed goods). 
Rather, it must mean ‘the absence of good within good.’ ‘Nothing’, in other words, signifies that 
Augustine both pursues and receives deficient forms of divinity, praise, friendship, and pleasure. In 
terms of the right ordering of his will, what Augustine both seeks and receives (and becomes present, 
as a phenomenon, to his will as a non-essential reality) is not gain but loss. The latter does not 
augment his integrity but negates or diminishes it. It is certainly the case that Augustine’s behavior 
is purposely self-destructive but that presupposes that his will has some kind of natural orientation 
towards God which is recognized yet contradicted. As disorder is known though order and vice 
presupposes virtue, Augustine teaches that self-destruction is understood through awareness of the 
nature of personal integrity. 
Augustine’s account of moral evil in conf. 7.16.22 is instructive on this matter. He claims 
that “wickedness (iniquitas) is … not … a substance (non … substantiam) but a perversity of will 
(voluntatis perversitatem) twisted … away (detortae) from the highest substance (a summa 
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substantia) … towards inferior things (in infima), rejecting its own inner life (proicientis intima sua) 
… and swelling with external matter (et tumescentis foras).”59 Augustine’s point is not that will
(which, for him, can be coterminous with mind, mindset, moral self, love, and wish or want60) is 
obliterated but that its disordered love for creatures causes it to somewhat bury its proper orientation 
towards God beneath what is essentially external (in the sense of contradictory) to itself. Augustine 
does not claim that will is replaced by a ‘nill’ (since that would entail an evil thing – and therefore an 
evil creator God). In other words, he asserts neither that a morally evil will qua will is a substance, 
i.e. a naturally occurring individual thing (e.g. as man and/or essential parts of man exist), nor that a 
will’s morally evil disposition is an essential characteristic belonging therein (as quantity, in the form 
of weight, belongs to each man). Rather, Augustine maintains that will’s disordered love for the 
created order causes it to weigh itself down with impediments. The latter – mental realities like (i) 
memories of bad deeds and/or influences or encouragements and/or (ii) bad dispositions or habits 
– are non-essential essential-characteristic-like characteristics or presences that obstruct will from
acting as it should. Hence, will’s misfortune and/or contradictory activity has added realities, in the 
manner of weight, unto itself that are essentially external to its proper orientation and either place it 
into a state of privation or exaggerate a pre-existing privative state. Moreover, the realities that the 
term privation describes are ‘nothings’ insofar as their mode of being is parasitic on substantial and 
essential realities. Therefore, just as rust depends on metal, a morally evil will depends on will. Like 
rust, moral evil is neither a substance nor an essential characteristic found either in substance or in 
an essential characteristic – rather, it is a non-essential characteristic belonging to the will. In this 
instance, privation doesn’t mean nothing at all but nothing positive. By contrast, will’s (i) adhering 
to strictly human good dispositions and habits and (ii) related assent to remembering strictly human 
good deeds and/or influences and/or encouragements would add something positive to will since 
these can help conform it to its proper end.  
Based, however, on Augustine’s consideration of his will’s conversion to God in conf. 8, he 
doesn’t seem to think that the above realities, if originated strictly by man, add something essential 
to will. He implies that they would fortify will’s proper orientation since agreeing with and 
developing it. These realities, then, would be positive instead of negative non-essential 
characteristics; they would add positive, rather than negative, weight. On the other hand, 
Augustine’s teaching in conf. 8.12-29—9.1.1 concerning God’s direct action on his will claims that 
God’s grace in conjunction with human effort (i.e. when man explicitly acknowledges and conforms 
to the nature of his relationship with God) adds something genuinely positive, i.e. positive essential 
characteristics, to will so that will becomes decisively fortified in conforming to its proper end. In 
this instance (or, at minimum, in terms of will’s conversion), Augustine seems to designate some 
kind of permanent change for the better to will’s ontological structure – it is less that positive weight 
is added to will (though that is, in a way, true) than that will’s structure is positively altered. Indeed, 
it is from this perspective that Confessor Augustine analyzes the theft of pears he committed as an 
adolescent. 
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Hence, awareness of the dynamics of and difference between man’s/will’s implicit and 
explicit relationship with God enables us to better understand Augustine’s meaning of ‘nothing’ in 
conf. 2.8.16. ‘Nothing’ does not mean the complete absence of good, in the sense of a complete 
absence of being, but the absence of the proper good within a good. Augustine’s point is that 
although he was pursuing and enjoying goods, he was seeking deficiently deficient goods; and 
therefore, he received deficient goods and deficiency. In this respect – i.e. because of the ontological 
gap between what ought to have been and what was, his actions and their outcomes were ‘nothings’. 
Augustine’s pleasure was real but, other things being equal, it was qualitatively less real than what 
virtuous action would have elicited.  
 
(iii) Conclusion 
It is evident, therefore, that commentators on conf. 2 underestimate the profound dignity 
that Augustine ascribes to human nature as imago Dei. This is because adhering to Augustine’s 
principal doctrine shows, on the one hand, that and why his analysis of the theft of pears is not 
scrupulous and, on the other hand, how he provides a persuasive account of wrong-doing in general 
and of the motivations behind the theft of pears in particular. 
Why, then, does Augustine condemn so harshly the theft of pears? Against those 
commentators inclined to trivialize that theft, Augustine judges that his attempt to arrogate divinity 
reverses the order of reality. Whereas man and human society is properly imago Dei, Augustine and 
his friends claim that God is imago hominis. At bottom, Augustine and his friends did not steal to 
enjoy the pears or some other participated good to which end the pears were a means, but to reject 
the objective moral order established by divine law and substitute, in its place, a human order 
explicitly recognized as false. Their goal – though impossible to gain – was to scale the heavens and 
topple the regime. Augustine and his companions claimed divine status but received, fittingly, the 
status of slaves. The most they could achieve was a human regime or club that claims to defy heaven 
but really destroys the integrity of its own members. 
According to Augustine’s metaphysical perspective, every sin has the same essential 
structure; but the young Augustine’s sin is especially blameworthy since, together with his 
companions, he explicitly rejects the divine order by arrogating divine omnipotence to himself and 
to his friends. The immediate effects upon the pears and the farmer who owned them are relatively 
minor. Nevertheless, the psychological effect upon Augustine’s soul is devastating because even 
though he views his sinful action as a ‘gain’ it diminishes significantly his being. Augustine is ‘less 
human’ than before not only because he has sinned but also because this particular sin establishes 
him in self-conscious opposition to the order of the universe and, therefore, to his own fulfillment 
as a person. Augustine remains imago Dei but he has diminished his capacity to fulfill his nature, i.e. 
to be explicitly imago Dei. 
Moreover, our study of Augustine’s analysis of his theft of pears allows us to infer that he 
employs therein six governing principles (see below). Augustine’s consecutive studies of sin in 2.5.10 
Humanities Bulletin, Volume 1, Number 2, 2018
25 
and 2.6.13 suggest that, for him, principles (iii) and (iv) are first in the order of discovery and that 
these are followed, in some manner, by principles (v) and (vi). Nevertheless, Augustine’s actual 
centerpiece is principle (i), viz. that man is imago Dei, since it distinguishes his notion of the concrete 
relationship with God that constitutes human being; and Augustine’s second most important 
principle is (ii) since, following from principle (i), it details some of the key ontological dimensions 
structuring the dynamic relationship between man and God. Most important, this allows us to make 
clear the difference between Augustine’s analysis of his theft of pears and that furnished by those 
commentators, whom we divided into two parties, sharing his view that the theft was a heinous sin. 
In general, both parties underestimate the depth of Augustine’s metaphysical perspective. However, 
while one party views the entire matter within a structure of participation rooted in God but apart 
from recognizing that the apex of Augustine’s structure consists in the spiritual unity of God and 
man, the other party shares the former’s view of Augustine’s participation structure but places man 
both inside and outside of that structure in its effort to explain his theft of pears. Therefore, whereas 
the one party fails to unify Augustine’s motive for sinning because it lacks sufficient understanding 
of Augustine’s primary doctrine that man is essentially theological the other party, for the same 
reason, claims that Augustine’s analysis stands both inside and outside of a theocentric participation 
structure. Hence, in different ways, each party truncates Augustine’s actual participation structure 
by failing to acknowledge that the latter is grounded in the claim that man is intrinsically related to 
God by the mode of spiritual union.  
Looked at in another manner, the general distinction between Augustine’s view and that of 
the commentators is this: whereas the latter analyzes Augustine’s study, to greater and lesser degrees, 
by more or less agreeing with key aspects of his account of the order of discovery, his own analysis 
(which his experience shows is arrived at by the order of discovery61) is ultimately by what he 
understands as the order of being (and, for him, the order of importance). Therefore, while the 
commentators assimilate Augustine’s hierarchically related analyses of sin apart from recognizing his 
governing perspective on the relationship between man and God, Augustine makes his overall 
analysis – which includes the aforementioned studies of sin – in light of his governing perspective. 
As Augustine’s confessio mode of narrative underscores, he judges that apart from understanding 
that man has some underlying spiritual relationship with God and neighbor, i.e. that man is imago 
Dei, the fact, circumstances, and gravity of human sinning could not otherwise be ascertained.  
I state below Augustine’s principles according to what his confessio narrative shows is the 
order of importance.  
(i) Man is a participated good of irreducible value because, as his awareness of the moral law 
and attraction to created and uncreated goods shows, he is (a) established by God together, i.e. in 
relationship, with God according to the mode of spiritual union and (b) ordered to right union with 
Him (and therefore with his neighbor) as his ultimate goal.  
(ii) While the right ordering of goods via virtue brings man towards his proper end (or 
purpose) of unity with God, wrong ordering, i.e. sin, leads him away from this end. In particular, 
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whereas virtuous actions, with or without explicit divine aid, are a positive reality integrating the 
human person, sinful actions are a negative reality disintegrating or diminishing him. Other things 
being equal, however, while the person co-operating with explicit divine aid can be integrated 
essentially and/or non-essentially, the person co-operating with implicit divine aid can only be 
integrated non-essentially. By contrast, all those rejecting divine aid suffer and/or enjoy some 
measure of non-essential disintegration. In principle, however, disintegration can be worse for those 
rejecting explicit divine aid than for those rejecting implicit divine aid. Therefore, since man is 
intrinsically related, and therefore responding, to God, he is always either disintegrating or being 
integrated.   
(iii) There are uncreated and created goods, of greater and lesser intrinsic value, to which 
man –a participated good of irreducible value – is innately inclined. 
(iv) There is a Supreme (because Uncreated and Self-Sufficient) Good, i.e. God, in whom all 
created goods participate and who orders, through law, the relationship between these goods.  
(v) Man should value God above all created goods for, as these participate in God, it follows 
that to embrace rightly God is, in principle, to embrace rightly all participated goods. 
(vi) Man has choice of will, i.e. the power to embrace or reject the intrinsic value assigned to 
participated goods (including to himself) and to God. In other words, man can choose or deny his 
ordination to God.  
Therefore while the commentators, following aspects of the order of discovery, omit 
principles (i) and (ii), Augustine places them at the outset. Furthermore, Augustine implies that 
principles (i) and (ii) can be discovered and, if so, be provisionally placed at the end of the list. 
However, once the order of being is understood, those principles are properly placed at the outset.   
Additionally, as Augustine well recognizes, his overall analysis of sin requires a significant 
qualification concerning its claim that, objectively speaking (i.e. by understanding man as imago 
Dei), every sin participates in arrogating divinity and entails supplanting God with oneself and, 
consequently, a society ordained towards divinity with a society aiming otherwise. This is because, 
as conf. 2.5.10-11 shows, it is certainly not the case that every sin is motivated by arrogating divinity. 
Unlike the young Augustine and his companions, not everyone appropriates divinity. Many sin for 
the sake of what Augustine called ‘the lower goods,’ viz. for sensual pleasure and ostensible career 
goals, domestic peace, political peace, power, money, fame – and, by this claim, warrant a relatively 
milder penalty. Hence, just as Augustine’s analysis of sin by the order of being respects, rather than 
negates, the order of discovery it also respects the order of experience.  
Finally, it is reasonably maintained that Augustine’s fundamental point in conf. 2 is not only 
that God is Truthful Love and Loving Truth and man is truthful love and loving truth but also that 
God, being what He Is, permits man to discover these matters by allowing him to reverse, for a time, 
the attributes belonging to the natures of God and of man. If this is so, Augustine is certainly not 
claiming that God positively wills sinning or that humans should sin. Rather, he would be asserting 
that God employs human waywardness to lead humans towards rectitude. Perhaps this helps to 
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explain why Augustine presents his teaching on the theft of pears by the mode of confessio. In any 
event, it is plainly apparent that Augustine’s medium represents his message. 
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2. All translations are from Saint Augustine: Confessions, translated with an introduction and notes by
H. Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press; 1991). This passage is found in book 2, chapter
4, paragraph 9 and page 29 (2.4.9, p. 29). I have occasionally inserted Augustine’s Latin into
Chadwick’s translation for emphasis and clarification. Augustine’s Latin has been taken from J.J.
O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions, Volume 1, Introduction and Text (Oxford: Clarendon Press;
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3. This response is typical: “Rum thing to see a man making a mountain out of robbing a pear tree in
his teens.” Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski, Jan. 5, 1921, Holmes-Laski Letters (I), ed. M. de 
W. Howe, 1953, 300. This is cited by Peter Brown in Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London and 
Boston: Faber and Faber; 1967), 172, footnote #5. 
4. For example, Friedrich Nietzsche writes: “… I was just reading the Confessions of Saint Augustine.
…What a high-flown wordsmith! Such tear-jerking phoniness! How hard I laughed, for example, over
a “pear theft” of his youth, made the basis for his account of his student days.” (This text is cited by
O’Donnell [1992] vol. 2, 227, and translated by Wills [2003], 3.) Mann (1979), 51, characterizes well
the notion that Augustine is scrupulous: “One is inclined to say that if this is the foulest sin that
Augustine could muster from his repertoire, then he led an exemplary childhood.”
5. E.g. P. Hallie, “The Evil That Men Think—And Do,” Hastings Center Report, December 1985,
reprinted in Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life, eds. Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, (New York:
Harcourt College Publishers; 2001), 36-46.
6. I have not encountered this objection to Augustine’s analysis in the scholarly literature, viz. ‘No
one—whether joined with divine grace or not—can perfectly obey divine law; without grace the task
of obedience is especially difficult; the young Augustine did not have grace at that time in his life;
therefore it is to be expected—in fact, it is almost inevitable—that he break the law. On this account,
his guilt is negligible. He ought to judge more harshly those who have divine grace yet break the law.’
As we will see by the end of this paper, Augustine would reply that what he did was his own
responsibility and very bad since he knew that he was rejecting God, but that someone does worse
who rejects God while being joined with divine grace.
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7. Conf. 2.1.1 and 2. 4.9, p. 29: “Such was my heart, O God, such was my heart. You had pity on it 
when it was at the bottom of the abyss. Now let my heart tell you what it was seeking there in that I 
became evil (ut essem … malum) for no reason (gratis).” Augustine thinks that his analysis of the theft 
of pears is not a study of mid-adolescence but of the state of mind or moral character he exhibited at 
that time. Most importantly, Augustine intends to elucidate the character of evil-doing as such by 
focusing principally on the motivation behind his theft of pears. On this basis, Augustine endeavors 
to distinguish the universal dimension of his behavior. 
8. Ibid., 2.2.3 and 3.3.6-8. 
9. Ibid., 2.7.15 and 2.10.18. 
10. Augustine cites and analyzes motives for murder in 2.5.11. One reason he focuses on murder is 
because in his day, as in ours, murder is considered a classic instance of moral evil. Augustine’s 
discussion of sin in 3.8.15-16 implies that murder is worse than theft because, other things being 
equal, it consists in the taking of innocent life rather than of someone’s material goods. 
11. Many scholars have noticed profound parallels between Augustine’s analysis of his theft of pears and 
the primal sins of (i) Adam and Eve and/or (ii) the fallen angels. For commentary see: Ferrari (1970 
and 1971); Starnes, 45; O’Donnell, Commentary on book 2, 126-28; Wills (1999), 13-15 and (2003), 
xv, 7-19, 73-92; MacDonald, 397-8, 407-9; Cavadini, 28-34; and Vaught, 57-60, 64-5. To my mind, 
the commentators are right to parallel Augustine’s analysis of his pear-theft with biblical accounts of 
‘the Fall’ but I argue that they underestimate the depth of Augustine’s understanding of the 
relationship between God and man that permeates his analysis. In particular, I claim that Augustine 
decries his theft since it contradicted what he then recognized as his proper spiritual relationship with 
God and neighbor. This presupposes two important implications: first, that the primal sin of Adam 
and Eve vitiates but does not obliterate a spiritual relationship between God and man (a matter which 
I do not discuss), and second (a matter I discuss) that the adolescent Augustine’s theft of pears 
knowingly attempted to reverse that relationship’s proper order. 
12. By ‘metaphysical’ or ‘objective’ I signify Augustine’s understanding of the ultimate structure and 
meaning of reality and therefore of the human person. In conf. 2, Augustine emphasizes especially 
that: (i) man is made by God, i.e. by the Self-Sufficient and Good Creator of the universe; (ii) man is 
in relationship with and for the purpose of perfect union with Him; and (iii) man achieves right 
union with God by ordering rightly (i.e. to God) his thoughts and actions.  
13. In other words, Augustine holds that pride (superbia) is the root of all moral evil. The subjective 
dimension is the sinner’s motive, i.e. what kind of pride does he embrace? According to Augustine, 
every sin arrogates divinity but while lesser sins are carried out principally for the sake of some 
participated good, the greatest sins are done for the sake of arrogating divinity. Augustine claims that 
he committed a grievous sin since, generally speaking, he embraced pride for its own sake. 
14. Although Augustine asserts it is by God’s gift that he has become self-consciously united with God 
and is aiming for perfect spiritual union with Him in the future, he also claims that he has always 
been united with God. In his words: “Where therefore did I find you, so that I could learn about 
you? … Late have I loved you, beauty (pulchritudo) so old and so new: late have I loved you! But 
behold, you were within (intus) and I was in external things (foris) and sought you there, and in those 
beautiful things that you made I plunged into deformity (deformis inruebam). You were with me, 
and I was not with you … You called and cried out loud and shattered by deafness … You were 
fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now pant after you; I tasted you and I hunger and thirst; you 
touched me, and I was set on fire for your peace” (10.26.37–27.38, p. 201). In fact, as 13.11.12 shows, 
Augustine ultimately maintains that each human being is imago Dei as imago Trinitatis. He writes: 
“Who can understand the omnipotent Trinity (Trinitatem omnipotentem)? ... These three aspects 
(ista tria) of the self are very different from the Trinity, but ... on this triad they [i.e. humans] could 
well exercise their minds and examine the problem, thereby becoming aware how far distant they are 
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from it. The three aspects I mean are being, knowing, willing (esse, nosse, velle). ... In these three ... let 
him who is capable of so doing contemplate how inseparable in life they are (quam sit inseparabilis 
vita): one life, one mind, one essence (una vita, una mens et una essentia), yet ultimately there is 
distinction (tamen distinctio), for they are inseparable, yet distinct. ... So, the divine being is and 
knows itself and is immutably sufficient to itself, because of the overflowing greatness of the unity“ 
(13.11.12, pp. 279-80). Hence, Augustine teaches that human being as such is spriritually united with 
God; man, he claims, is essentially theological.  
15. For further explanation see ahead n. # 29.
16. On the one hand, I will analyze portions of the arguments of the first three commentators instead of
those by Cavadini and Vaught since the latter express views that are ultimately typical of the former.
Each of these five commentators maintain that Augustine’s analysis upholds the primacy of
ontological goodness but do not go far enough. While Starnes, MacDonald and Wills maintain that
man participates in God, Cavadini (30-2) and Vaught (54-5, 57-8, 60-5) suggest, at decisive points,
that relationship with God is integral to human nature. For his part, Cavadini (31) claims that conf.
2.6.14 (i.e. where Augustine speaks of his sinning as a ‘perverse imitation of God’) “is in a way the
key to the whole of Book Two … [since] … the governing themes of fornication, of turning away
from God in the quest for a self-subsistent existence without God, the consequent lapse into the
insubstantiality of shadow and death, and allusion to the Genesis text all come together.” Likewise,
Vaught (60-1) writes that “the pear-stealing episode represents … [that] … God and the soul that falls
away from him are on opposite ends of an ontological continuum. … From this perspective, the
imitation of God is a negative reflection of omnipotence, which implies that there is no place we can
depart from God completely.” Nevertheless neither of these authors—like Starnes, MacDonald, and
Wills—explicitly maintain that Augustine’s analysis of his pear-theft is made in light of
understanding that man as such is spiritually united with God for the sake of attaining perfect union
with Him. On the other hand, I will analyze separately key aspects of Crosby’s article since it agrees
with Augustine’s teaching but uniquely claims that Augustine’s analysis denies, in crucial respects,
the primacy of ontological goodness. Hence my thesis, then, is that both parties, albeit in different
ways, lack explicit recognition of the high degree to which Augustine upholds the primacy of
ontological goodness in his doctrine that man, by the fact of his spiritual unity with God, is essentially
theological.
17. By divine or eternal law Augustine includes (i) what is commonly named natural law, and (ii) human
laws representing legitimate extensions and applications of divine law. For a summary of his views
on law together with some bibliography see R.J. Dougherty, “Natural Law,” in Saint Augustine
through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. A. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans; 1999), 582-4.
18. Conf., 2.4.9, pp. 28-9.
19. See Augustine’s discussions of law at 1.18.29 and 3.7.13-8.16. He thinks that everyone has some
primordial awareness of the ‘Golden Rule’ and of the related precept ‘to love God and neighbor.’
20. For further commentary see Starnes, 38-40.
21. Conf. 2.4.9, p. 29. Augustine writes: “Wickedness [to steal] filled me (ego furtum facere volui et feci).
I stole something which I had in plenty and of much better quality. My desire was to enjoy not what
I sought by stealing but merely the excitement of thieving and the doing of what was wrong (nec ea
re volebam frui quam furto appetebam, sed ipso furto et peccato)….I had no motive for my wickedness
except wickedness itself (et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi militia). It was foul (foeda erat) and
I loved it (et amavi eam). I loved the self-destruction (amavi perire), I loved my fall (amavi defectum
meum), not the object for which I had fallen (non illud ad quod deficiebam) but my fall itself (sed
defectum meum ipsum amavi). My depraved soul leaped down from your firmament to ruin. I was
seeking not to gain anything by shameful means, but shame for its own sake.”
22. Ibid., 2.5.10, pp. 29-30.
Barry David - Augustine’s Analysis of his Theft of Pears – the Medium Represents the Message 
  
30 
23. I use the term ‘soul’ to signify the human person; ‘soul’ is a fitting substitution since that is the 
person’s innermost self, i.e. the locus of consciousness, life, thought, feeling, conscience, decision-
making, and action. 
24. What is meant by ‘participation in God’? At minimum, it signifies that every thing (i.e. substance) 
God makes (i) is like God and (ii) ultimately depends on Him for its existence, mode of existence, 
and development/fulfillment. Some passages from conf. 1.6.10 and 1.7.12 make this doctrine clear. 
While describing his coming into existence as an infant, Augustine maintains that (i) since nothing 
mutable—i.e. what comes into existence and passes away (plants, animals, minerals, humans, galaxies 
and universes)—can bring itself into existence (it is plainly evident that no plant or species of plant 
brings itself into existence); and (ii) since mutable creatures are characterized by definitive attributes 
like existence, life, form, and beauty; it follows (iii) that the existence of mutable creatures (and 
therefore the attributes they possess) depends on the existence of an immutable God in Whom there 
is no distinction between what He is and what Existence, Life, Form and Beauty is. In other words, 
it is because of and for the sake of God that everything (that is not God) exists. Apart from Him 
nothing else would be; since God ‘Is’, everything/substance that is is (n.b. Augustine doesn’t classify 
‘evil’ as a substance [7.12.18]). Therefore, every non-divine substance and its essential characteristics 
exist by participation in God. By contrast, certain non-essential characteristics found in things, like 
evil dispositions, exist by the mode of privation. 
25. Ibid., 2.5.10, p. 30. 
26. Ibid., 2.5.11, p. 30. Augustine writes: “When a crime is under investigation to discover the motive 
for which it was done (qua causa factum sit), the accusation is not usually believed except in cases 
where the appetite to obtain (or the fear of losing) one of those goods we have called inferior appears 
a plausible possibility. They are beautiful and attractive even if, in comparison with the higher goods 
which give true happiness (prae bonis superioribus et beatificis), they are mean and base. A man 
committed murder. Why? Because he loved another’s wife or his property; or he wanted to acquire 
money to live on by plundering his goods; or he was afraid of losing his own property by the action 
of his victim; or he had suffered injury and burned with desire for revenge. No one would commit 
murder without a motive, merely because he took pleasure in killing.” 
27. Ibid., 2.6.12, p. 30. 
28. Ibid., 2.6.12, p. 31. 
29. Ibid. Augustine writes: “And now…I inquire what was the nature of my pleasure in the theft (quaero 
quid me in furto delectaverit). The act has nothing lovely about it, none of the loveliness found in 
equity and prudence, or in the human mind whether in the memory or in the senses, or in physical 
vitality. Nor was it beautiful in the way the stars are, noble in their courses, or earth and sea full of 
newborn creatures which, as they are born, take the place of those which die; not even in the way 
that specious vices have a flawed reflection of beauty.” 
30. Ibid., 2.6.13, p. 31. In Augustine’s words: “Pride (superbia) imitates what is lofty (celsitudinem 
imitator); but you alone are God most high above all things (cum tu sis unus super omnia deus 
excelsus). What does [the sin of] ambition seek but honor and glory? Yet you alone are worthy of 
honor and are glorious for eternity. The [sin of] cruelty of powerful people aims to arouse fear. Who 
is to be feared but God alone? What can be seized or stolen from his power? When or where or how 
or by whom? … [the sin of] Curiosity appears to be a zeal for knowledge; yet you supremely know 
all.… [The sin of] Idleness appears as desire for a quiet life; yet can rest be assured apart from the 
Lord? [The sin of] Luxury wants to be called abundance and satiety; but you are fullness and the 
inexhaustible treasure of incorruptible pleasure…. [The sin of] Avarice wishes to have large 
possessions; you possess everything. [The sin of] Envy contends about excellence; but what it more 
excellent than you? [The sin of] Anger seeks revenge; who avenges with greater justice than you?” 
31. Ibid., 2.6.14, p. 32. 
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32. This is especially Mann (1979), 56-7.
33. Conf., 2.6.14, p. 32.
34. Apparently following Von Hildebrand, Crosby (331) names this “subjective satisfaction.”
35. By ‘less human’ I mean that the agent is less oriented than before to his proper end of perfect spiritual
union with God. I do not mean that he loses his human nature as such, ceases to be in the image and
likeness of God, or forsakes completely his capacity to be united with God.
36. Note again Augustine’s profound metaphysical standpoint—while a person’s orientation towards
God is a positive reality the orientation away from Him is a negative reality (i.e. a nothing [nihil]). In
the first instance, the subject undergoes a positive change; in the second instance, he undergoes a
negative change (or privation). Augustine makes this distinction in light of his objective
understanding of the human person.
37. Conf., 2.8.16, p. 33.
38. Cf. Starnes, 44-5.
39. MacDonald, 407.
40. Ibid., 404-11.








49. City of God, 14.13.
50. Starnes, 44.
51. Ibid., 45.
52. As we have seen, Augustine maintains that every person participates in divinity insofar as he/she is
established in relationship for the sake of right union with God. However, one participates rightly in
divinity by ordering oneself to God rather than by ordering God to oneself, i.e. by acknowledging
that God is First Cause and that one is therefore a secondary and properly co-operative cause. One
of the central themes of conf. is that the path to authentic (and therefore to complete and perfect)
divinization is by humility rather than by presumption (see 7.18.24). When Augustine steals the
pears he is presumptuous; as he writes about his theft he is humble.
53. Cf. Starnes, 45; Cavadini, 32-3; and Vaught, 63-5.





59. Conf. 7.16.22, p. 126.
60. For consideration of Augustine’s account of will (voluntas/amor/consensus) together with an
extensive bibliography see M. Djuth, “Will,” in Saint Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia
(op. cit.), 881-5.
61. E.g. conf. 7.10.16; 17.23 and 9.10.23-25.
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